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After	2008,	the	reputation	of	bankers	took	a	nosedive,
but	are	bankers	really	that	bad?
“Honesty	is	the	first	chapter	in	the	book	of	wisdom.”	That’s	what	Thomas	Jefferson,	Founding	Father	and	third
president	of	the	United	States,	once	said.	If	that’s	true,	then	you	might	think	that	bankers	are	stuck	on	the	first	page,
such	is	the	public	perception	of	them.
Following	the	2008	global	financial	crisis,	the	reputation	of	bankers	took	a	nosedive.	Public	scandals	and	negative
press	coverage	portrayed	bankers	as	greedy	and	dishonest.	This	was	compounded	by	the	findings	of	a	Swiss	study
published	in	Nature	in	2014,	entitled	“Business	culture	and	dishonesty	in	the	banking	industry”.	By	using	an
experimental	task,	the	authors	of	this	study	explored	the	culture	of	the	banking	industry	to	see	if	it	made	bankers
more	likely	to	act	dishonestly	to	maximise	profits	compared	to	professionals	from	other	industries.	Their	findings
suggested	bankers	were	more	dishonest	than	other	professions,	when	they	were	asked	to	think	about	their
profession	–	which	the	researchers	put	down	to	the	culture	of	the	banking	industry.	These	findings	garnered	plenty
of	press	attention	and	further	painted	the	banking	sector	in	a	negative	light.
We	assembled	a	team	of	researchers	from	the	Max	Planck	Institute	for	Human	Development,	the	London	School	of
Economics	and	Political	Science	and	the	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	to	see	whether	the	study’s	findings
were	the	same	across	other	countries	and	contexts.
Whilst	the	2014	study	surveyed	208	bankers	in	two	studies	and	133	non-banking	professionals,	and	was	only
conducted	in	one	country,	we	ran	the	same	experiment	with	1,282	participants	in	five	different	samples	from	the
Asia-Pacific,	the	Middle	East	and	Europe.	Among	our	participants	were	768	bankers	across	two	jurisdictions,	plus
professionals	from	other	sectors.
How	do	you	study	a	lie?
The	experiment	used	in	the	original	study	and	by	us	looked	at	whether	participants	would	lie	to	increase	their
earnings.	Each	sample	was	split	into	two	groups.	Participants	in	one	group	were	asked	questions	about	their
profession	before	the	experiment	began;	those	in	the	other	group	were	asked	about	their	leisure	activities.
Participants	then	tossed	a	coin	several	times	without	anyone	observing	them	and	entered	their	results	online.	In
each	round,	they	were	informed	whether	‘heads’	or	‘tails’	would	generate	a	reward.	This	gave	participants	the
opportunity	to	increase	their	reward	by	lying.	Although	lying	was	not	assessed	at	the	individual	level,	it	could	be
detected	at	the	group	level.	This	is	because	if	nobody	lies,	the	overall	ratio	of	winning	to	losing	outcomes	should	be
approximately	fifty-fifty.	If	a	group	claimed	to	have	tossed	far	more	winning	outcomes,	the	researchers	could	infer
lying	in	that	group.
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Bankers	aren’t	that	bad!
Our	findings	are	not	in	line	with	the	2014	study.
The	results	showed	that	there	were	no	significant	differences	in	the	bankers’	behaviour,	depending	on	whether	they
were	primed	to	think	about	their	work	or	leisure	activities.	This	suggests	that	the	2014	findings	cannot	be
generalised	to	all	banking	cultures.	What’s	more,	we	found	that	banker	dishonesty	was	unaffected	by	whether	a
reward	could	be	won	for	themselves	or	for	charity.
And	people	don’t	expect	them	to	be…
Like	the	original	study,	we	also	explored	the	general	population’s	expectations	of	banker	honesty.	The	2014
experiments	showed	that	people	expected	bankers	to	be	more	dishonest	than	other	professionals	–	for	example,
medical	doctors.	But	this	wasn’t	seen	in	our	new	study,	which	supports	the	idea	that	banker	culture	differs	from
country	to	country.
The	problem	with	sample	selection
Our	findings	could	be	due	to	a	number	of	reasons.	One	possible	explanation	is	that	just	like	the	general
population’s	relative	expectations	of	banker	behaviour	vary	across	jurisdictions,	so	the	banking	culture	in	the
original	jurisdiction	may	not	be	found	consistently	across	other	countries.
A	second	reason	might	be	that	we	sampled	more	honest	banks.	In	wake	of	the	2014	study’s	highly	publicised
findings,	only	banks	that	were	confident	in	the	soundness	of	their	culture	might	have	agreed	to	take	part	in	the	new
study.	Of	the	27	financial	institutions	approached	—	including	14	investment	banks	—	only	two	commercial	banks
were	willing	to	participate.	This	selection	bias	made	rigorous	testing	of	the	original	findings	challenging	but	is	an
intrinsic	by-product	of	any	highly	publicised	field	study	–	which	can	only	be	overcome	by	running	more	experiments
ahead	of	the	publication	of	highly	sensational	findings.
Bankers’	culture	is	heterogenous
Over	a	decade	on	from	the	2008	global	financial	crisis,	there	is	an	ongoing	concern	regarding	the	honesty	of
bankers	and	the	banking	sector.	We	hope	our	work	provides	a	helpful,	empirically	based	reminder	that	there	can	be
significant	variation	in	banking	culture	across	institutions	and	jurisdictions,	with	banker	culture	similar	to	other
professional	cultures,	not	necessarily	undermining	honesty.
	♣♣♣
This	blog	post	appeared	originally	on	LSE’s	Department	of	Management	blog.	It	is	based	on	the	authors’s
paper	Heterogeneity	in	banker	culture	and	its	influence	on	dishonesty,	with	Erez	Yoeli,	in	Nature,	2019.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics	and	Political	Science.
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